Beyond disclosure: Managing conflicts of interest to strengthen trust in our profession  by McKneally, Martin F.
B
s
M
Editorials McKneally
3
ED
ITO
RIA
Leyond disclosure: Managing conflicts of interest to
trengthen trust in our profession
artin F. McKneally, MD
C
v
s
d of our
p
m
h
w
w
e
o
p
e
o
a
p
fi
b
d
c
a
t
o
r
r
c
s
i
u
r
t
a
b
b
C
W
i
a able
oFrom the Department of Surgery, Univer-
sity of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada.
M.M. reports equity ownership in Johnson
& Johnson and Merck.
Received for publication Sept 7, 2006; Ac-
cepted for publication Oct 6, 2006.
Address for reprints: Martin F. McKneally,
MD, Department of Surgery, University of
Toronto, 77 Forest Grove Dr, Toronto,
Ontario M2K 1Z4, Canada (E-mail:
martin.mckneally@utoronto.ca; dmckneally@
sympatico.ca).
J Thorac Cardiovasc Surg 2007;133:300-2
0022-5223/$32.00
Copyright © 2007 by The American Asso-
ciation for Thoracic Surgeryi
doi:10.1016/j.jtcvs.2006.10.005
00 The Journal of Thoracic and Cardioardiothoracic surgeons have competing personal and professional interests
that we balance skillfully every day with our obligations to our families, our
patients, our partners, and our institutions. Our financial interests in the
olatile market of technological innovations have gained recent public attention, as
urgeons and institutions participate in the invention and introduction of medical
evices.1 In this editorial, I will try to outline the ethical foundations 
rofession’s approach to financial interests and make some suggestions about their
anagement when they conflict with our professional obligations.
Trust binds civil society together. We trust others to deal with us with respect,
onesty, and fairness, and we trust them more each time they do so. In a perfect
orld, we might rely on virtue alone to ensure honesty and fairness. In our imperfect
orld, standards of conduct and role-specific obligations are defined and legally
nforced for those who are entrusted with superior knowledge, power, or authority
ver others, for example, physicians, scientists, lawyers, government officials,
olice, and overseers of institutions like hospitals and universities.
Members of our profession are trusted because we maintain high standards. The
thics of surgery—the values and principles that guide us—can be summarized in
ne word: trustworthiness. We are justifiably trusted to be technically competent
nd tirelessly committed to assuring that our patients receive the best care we can
rovide. In the fee-for-service system, we manage the inherent conflict between our
nancial incentive to perform operations and the interests of patients who may be
est served by nonoperative treatment. Almost unconsciously, we follow a well-
eveloped code of virtuous conduct ingrained during residency and reinforced by
ollegial standards and community respect.
We try to report our clinical and research results honestly, giving an unbiased
ccount to help other practitioners and researchers improve on current approaches to
he difficult problems we diagnose and treat. Researchers are held to a high standard
f unbiased communication because science is built on the foundation of publicly
eported results of their investigations. The standard is enforced by peer and public
eview. Deliberate deception leads to public and professional disgrace. The false
laim by South Korean researcher Hwang Woo-suk—that he created new patient-
pecific stem cell lines—is a vivid recent example of betrayal of society’s trust. His
nterest in personal and professional advancement (which was temporarily spectac-
lar) led to an unethical breach of his obligation as a scientist to conduct and report
eliable research fully and honestly.
Sometimes false or misleading assertions are not the result of deliberate decisions
o deceive. They may arise from unconscious bias in our interpretation of the facts
s we see them. The lens through which we see our data can be distorted by strong
ut unrecognized elements of belief, hope, self-deception, or self-interest. Our
iases can influence our perceptions.
onflicts of Interests
hen personal or private interests in advancement, profit, or other advantages might
nterfere with a publicly recognized professional obligation, the situation is defined
s a conflict of interest (COI).2 The existence of a COI is not necessarily culp
r harmful, but it requires management to prevent interference, or the perception of
nterference, with a professional obligation.
vascular Surgery ● February 2007
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Lanaging COIs
OIs are managed by disclosure, mediation by an objective
hird party, or various forms of prohibition.3 The minimum
tandard of management of COI is voluntary disclosure of
he situation—warning the public or particular vulnerable per-
ons, such as our patients, of our potential bias. Mediation and
rohibition are progressively more stringent measures.
Disclosure. Disclosure is generally accepted as adequate
anagement of minimal conflicts. Disclosure is also ac-
epted widely as an appropriate procedure when more se-
ious conflicts arise. We currently accept disclosure as a
ufficient form of COI management in our professional
eetings and publications. Although intended to provide
ransparency, disclosure leaves analysis of the magnitude
nd impact of bias to the listener or reader to decode. The
iscloser, who could explain the conflict and clarify its
anagement, can obscure or leave unspecified the extent of
he conflict, for example, the involvement of a commercial
ponsor in the control of data or the analysis and interpre-
ation of results. Semitransparent statements that an author
has a financial relationship” with a manufacturer or insti-
ution whose interests will benefit from a positive report are
ommonly accepted but insufficient explanations of man-
gement of COI.
Mediation. Mediation by an independent third party is a
ore effective and publicly defensible level of management
f COI. The reference standard exemplifying this approach
s the management of equity shares held in industries that do
usiness with government. When an industry leader is ap-
ointed to government service, the appointee’s shares are
ransferred to an independent trust fund managed without
nterference from the potentially conflicted official. This
educes the risk or appearance that decisions made on behalf
f the public will be influenced by the financial interests of
he appointee.
In medicine, ownership of equity shares in a company
hat manufactures a device or drug may bias practitioners’
udgments about prescribing the product for their patients or
escribing its effectiveness in a research report. Highly
ublicized problems with investigators’ and institutions’
quity ownership, for example, of gene transfer technology
n the tragic case of Jesse Gelsinger,*4 have led to th
ntroduction of COI committees at many universities, hos-
itals, and clinics. These committees provide advice and
uidance through institutionally mandated policies on man-
gement of conflicts. A substantial organization of highly
ualified participants in COI committees in the United
tates—the Forum on Conflict of Interest in Academe,
hich is affiliated with the Association of American Med-
Jesse died of a massive systemic inflammatory response after receiving the
rnithine transcarbamylase gene delivered through an adenovirus vector. Un-
isclosed lethal toxicity in animal studies and deviation from the treatmenti
rotocol were linked to his physician’s financial interests in the vector, sold
hortly afterward for $13.5 million USD.
The Journal of Thoraciccal Colleges—meets annually and converses actively on-
ine to share ideas about management of COIs (personal
ommunication from Julie Gottlieb, 2006).
Institutional review boards and research ethics boards
ave been asked to mediate or advise on COI at some
nstitutions. Their focus on patient protection and consent
akes this seem a logical extension of their responsibilities.
owever, these boards are generally overstretched, and the
nancial details of COI management are complex. For these
easons, institutional COI committees are proving to be a
ore effective solution. COI management by mediation is
mplemented by impartial data managers, statistical ana-
ysts, safety monitoring boards, review committees, editors,
nd peer reviewers.
Prohibition. Prohibition is the most severe and defini-
ive form of COI management. Some conflicts are so sub-
tantial that prohibition or abstention is required. For exam-
le, judges avoid the appearance of bias by recusing
hemselves from legal cases involving their relatives, asso-
iates, or business interests. For similar reasons, some med-
cal journals prohibit editors and authors of review articles
rom owning stock or retaining financial relationships with
ompanies whose value might be enhanced by favorable
eports in the journal. This requirement has become increas-
ngly problematical, because many prominent academic
hysicians and scientists have financial relationships with
ndustry. Understandably, these relationships are strongly
ncouraged by industry to ensure the input of leading re-
earchers and scholars into the quest for innovative and
atentable devices, drugs, and treatments. Some view this as
vicious cycle of increasing compromise of scientific in-
egrity. Others see a virtuous cycle in which industrial
artners provide the capacity for production, evaluation, and
istribution of new technology that could not be achieved
ithout their help.5 This is the rationale for institution
ollaboration with industry and venture capital in biotech-
ical startup companies within our universities and hospi-
als. I favor the virtuous cycle view, if it is well managed. In
ontrast, Bob Sade, chairman of the Ethics Committee of
he American Association for Thoracic Surgery, has argued
hat the best way to protect our professional integrity is to
void business entanglements entirely.6
ow We Manage COI in the Journal
he Journal’s ethical and legal obligation is to provide
eliable information and advice to subscribers and readers, a
iverse group that includes practitioners, researchers, and
tudents of cardiothoracic surgery. To manage potential
onflicts with this obligation, our editors and editorial board
egularly disclose their financial interests and recuse them-
elves from review of submissions whose authors, institu-
ions of origin, sponsors, or topic might bias their judgment
n the decision to publish. Guest reviewers similarly recuse
and Cardiovascular Surgery ● Volume 133, Number 2 301
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Lhemselves where conflicts might bias their advice. Authors
re required to list their commercial interests (fees, salary,
quity, grant support, patents) on a standard form as a
ondition of publication. After acceptance of a manuscript,
he interests that are judged relevant to the work are pub-
ished on the title page of the article. If questions arise, they
re referred to the corresponding author for clarification. A
mall Journal ethics committee adjudicates problems that
emain; its members are Jim Jones, Martin McKneally, Bob
ade, and Dick Sanderson.
We are still at the same stage of cumbersome detailed
anguage of disclosure that all journals currently employ.
lear definitions and consensus on practice will eventually
merge, as they did with independent ethics review of
esearch practices and animal care. We now have such a
lear and widespread understanding of the policies and
rocedures of research ethics and animal care committees
hat we accept the shorthand of a reference to their approval
s evidence of adequate management without detailed ex-
lanations. A clear and equally concise explanation will
volve as COI committees develop uniform standards. I am
onfident that progress toward this goal will be catalyzed by
he help of our readers, our ethics committees, and the
embers of our profession. In the interim, authors with COI
6
02 The Journal of Thoracic and Cardiovascular Surgery ● Febran strengthen the trustworthiness of their reports by de-
cribing their management of conflicts in the Discussion
ection of their articles, just as they currently describe the
imitations of their studies. These clarifications help readers
nd listeners put the findings and interpretations in perspec-
ive and evaluate how well the authors managed the influ-
nce of potential sources of bias as they developed, ana-
yzed, and reported their data.
I am grateful to Bob Sade, Dick Sanderson, and Deborah
cKneally for helpful comments on earlier versions of this edi-
orial.
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